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Horseplay: Equine Performance and Creaturely Acts in Cinema   
 
Béla Tarr‟s latest and reputedly final film, The Turin Horse (2011), takes its prompt from 
the story about an encounter that Nietzsche claims to have experienced with a maltreated 
horse on Via Carlo Alberto, Turin.
1
 Tarr‟s film opens with an image of a large horse 
pulling a cart through the bleak, inhospitable Hungarian landscape. Seen in close-up, and 
from a low angle, the mare (Ricsi), walks towards the camera. Blinkered and with a sweat-
matted coat, she progresses forwards, seeming to struggle with the extreme weight of her 
cargo. As she continues on her journey, the camera reveals her driver; he is Ohlsdorfer 
(János Derzsi), a stern, unkempt bearded man whose face remains expressionless 
throughout the film. The wind stirs up a dust on the unmade road and blows the man‟s hair 
and the horse‟s mane; at this point, with her ears set back, and her eyes showing white, the 
animal‟s demeanour signals unease and discomfort. Tarr continues his focus on the horse, 
the camera roving over her powerful, straining body, thus displaying the arduous work 
involved in this daily toil. At one point, she lowers her head and gathers her strength to 
pull harder against the wind and, surrounded by dust, she opens and closes her mouth, 
quickening her pace in the process. Towards the end of the sequence the man alights and 
leads the animal for the remainder of their journey home. Standing at her head, he pulls 
her by a rope up a grassy track which leads to an isolated farmhouse. As man and horse 
round the corner, the two are greeted by Ohlsdorfer‟s daughter (played by Erika Bók 
although, throughout the film, unlike Derzsi she is not given a character name). Moving 
agitatedly, and bracing herself against the wind, the animal appears uneasy as the man 
unshackles the cart. She throws her head from side to side and shies away in fear as the 
girl attempts to steady her by placing her hand on her neck. Eventually, the man leads the 
tired animal away and his daughter drags the cart into another outbuilding. Father and 
daughter provide fodder for the horse, who now stands tethered in her draughty stable, 
before they move outside to continue their daily tasks. Rather than following Ohlsdorfer 
and his daughter, however, the camera adopts the interior perspective of the stable, the 
door of which provides a framework to view the human activities, albeit this angle does 
not adopt the horse‟s point of view. Filmed in black and white throughout, the 
cinematographer, Fred Kelemen, creates the necessary bleak effect that Tarr desired and, 




Throughout this sequence, Tarr retains focus on the horse, and as the title of the film 
indicates, the spectator is left in no doubt that she is an important, if not the most 
important, individual within the narrative. However, unlike most films which feature 
animals as central protagonists, at no juncture is the horse provided an anthropomorphic 
treatment, or her behaviour articulated in human driven semantics.
3
 Furthermore, she is 
never presented with, what Emmanuel Gouabault, Annik Dubied and Claudine Burton-
Jeangros
4
 describe as, a superindividual status. This stated, neither does the director, 
devalue the role of the animal. Instead, Ricsi‟s performance can be analysed in, what 
Brenda Austin-Smith argues is, „memorable film characterization‟, whereby animal 
performance is valid and „counts for something‟.
5
 While it cannot be argued that Ricsi 
deliberately acts as a character, her performance is equally valuable for analysis both 
within and outside the context of the narrative. Applying performance theory and film 
theory to a study of the role and performance of the horses in two films, The Turin Horse, 
and Of Horses and Men (Erlingsson 2013), this essay proposes an alternative and more 
fitting approach to the study of animals in film. The contention here is that neither film 
humanises or starifies the horses, yet all of the equine presentations are significant, and are 
examples of what Michael Kirby
6
 terms „simple acting‟. This is a concept explored by 
2 
 
theatre scholar, Michael Peterson who pursues this notion in his discussion on the ethics of 
animal acts on stage. He purports that an anthropomorphic interpretation
7
 of the theatre 
animal relates to the construction of the performance as a whole, and for this reason, we 
see animals as entities rather than individual beings. For him, the „analysis of animals as 
objects of performance necessitates investigating how actual animals perform.‟
8
 This essay 
begins by examining the ways in which animal performance has predominantly been 
analysed and discussed in media and film before proposing Kirby‟s notion of simple 





As noted above, animals in film have been primarily discussed as nonhuman agents, a 
concept which invites the allegation of anthropomorphism.
10
 Indeed, they are frequently 
awarded human attributes and this often culminates in their attainment of star status.
11
 In 
2011, Gouabault, Dubied and Burton-Jeangros undertook an analysis of animals in the 
media and, subsequently, published their findings. They argued that, in the past few 
decades, animals have been humanised, provided names and emotions, their personal 
thoughts and feelings expressed in detail. Their research is based on an empirical analysis 
of Swiss press articles on Knut the polar bear cub who was born at Berlin Zoo, and 
received a substantial amount of media interest because he was abandoned by his mother 
and reared by a keeper. This attention raised the animal‟s status and Gouabault et al. began 
their research by first examining the concept of person in anthropological discourse, and 
then proceeded to identify three attributes of personification in animals commencing with 
the singular animal and culminating in, what they term, the „superindividual‟.
12
 The 
research suggests that to attain this status the following must be achieved: the notion of 
speaking for the animal, the attribution of an individual name (often human), an individual 
history, a national or territorial identity, interiority and a starification.   
 
Whereas Gouabault et al.‟s work is primarily related to media coverage of animals, their 
research can also apply to other visual platforms, including the representation of animals 
in film. Appearing in a variety of ways in this format, the cinematic animal often operates 
as the central protagonist, and is provided human-like qualities, the spectator enabled an 
understanding of what they think and feel through the use of film language. This also 
applies the concept of star theory and, whereas this has been extensively discussed and 
deliberated in Film Studies in relation to humans,
13
 only more recently has it been used 
comparatively with animals.
14
 Sometimes the filmic animal speaks human language, for 
example Arthur (Cosmo), the dog in Francis Lawrence‟s film, Beginners (2010); in a 
similar way to the mediatised superindividual, they are frequently awarded star quality by 
the press and publicity, for example Uggie in The Artist (Hazanavicius 2011) who is given 
a history, national and territorial identity and a personality. More significantly for this 
essay, the star animal onscreen is also heroised through their performance capabilities, 
often staging daring feats to rescue their master/mistress and redeem a situation.    
 
At the other end of the spectrum, Gouabault et al. argue, is the reportage of animal threat 
such as „dangerous dogs, mad cows, birds or pigs spreading the flu [which] seem more 
common than before, and these incidences, contrary to the trend of personification, 
reinforce human-animal alterity.‟
15
 Both of the above categories consider the animal 
semiotically which Peterson believes is also a common approach in theatre, thus rendering 
the performance void. As he suggests, the argument tends to be that if the animal becomes 







Tarr does not present the horse in The Turin Horse anthropomorphically. In the film, she is 
not given a name, neither is she heroised or mythologised in any way, or presented with a 
history or personality. However, she is not simply a presence without value, and neither is 
her performance entirely dictated by the film language. Indeed, there exists a middle 
ground in which to analyse her presentation which is a much neglected area in Film 
Studies. This is a situation whereby animals appear in film as neither personified, as 
superindividual, or threat; this type of performance is rarely discussed yet is an animal 




In her seminal article, Austin-Smith discusses three films, one of which includes the 
performance of the donkey in Robert Bresson‟s 1966 film, Au Hasard Balthazar. 
Adopting Kirby‟s system for the analysis of different types of acting, she proposes that 
animals in film are capable of „simple acting,‟ and that, „[i]n order to be valued, 
performance must be noticed and identified as [original italics] performance, rather than as 
star exhibition, an artefact of editing or the traces of someone merely living in front of the 
camera.‟
18
 In her analysis of the donkey she draws upon Kirby‟s continuum of acting and 
non acting. First outlined in 1972, Kirby devised a template suggesting that at one end of 
the scale was a non matrixed performance, whereby there is no intention to portray a 
character. Further along the scale „referential elements are applied to the performer‟,
19
 and 
audiences are presented with a person with features such as costume and props. The next 
step is received acting whereby a person accrues meaning from context „because it takes 
place within an already defined theatrical event.‟
20
 This might be the work of extras which 
operate as background to foreground events, through which the actors respond to their 
surroundings and other actors. The deeds in received acting may be compound, but do not 
fully constitute acting in Kirby‟s gamut. In fact, according to Kirby, all of the above are 
examples of non acting. At the other end of the spectrum is complex acting which is 
multidimensional, and the actor portrays a number of specific emotions to create the 
pretence. Sandwiched between non acting and complex acting, simple acting occurs 
whereby the performer does something to replicate or impersonate a character, or „engages 
in a process of selection and projection to present his or her beliefs or emotions to an 
audience.‟
21
 On these occasions there is „an intention to act on the part of the performer, 
“but no emotion needs to be involved”.‟
22
 Simple acting can involve an emotion that fits 
an existing situation, but, as Austin-Smith suggests, the main concern is that the 
performance in film is significant and even animal performance makes a difference, and 
„“counts for something,” in that they add complication and distinctiveness to the portrayal 





To clarify the position of anthropomorphism and Critical Animal Studies it is important to 
explain briefly the current scholarship in the field. Notwithstanding attempts to omit 
anthropomorphism from the discussion of animals in film, assessing their intentionality 
and emotion is a complex area and often attributing human qualities to animals occurs 
through implication. These problems are not only applicable to animal behaviour, but also 
to human behaviour and, as Hugh Lehman states, „[c]alling a characteristic “human” does 
not imply that only humans have this characteristic.‟
24
 Recent developments in Animal 
Studies have made some inroad into discussion of this thorny issue, and, as animal 
behaviourist, Chris Barnard, suggests „[r]egardless of how inclusively we choose to define 
cognition, the main problem with goals, intentions and awareness is that they belong to the 
private experience of the individual ... even our own species.‟
25
 Bernard Rollin suggests 
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that a certain „plausibility‟,
26
 should be permitted, a point also mooted by Barnard who 
proposes that „much of the argument for consciousness in other species rests simply on 
giving “the benefit of the doubt”, a belief that evolutionary continuity with ourselves 
makes consciousness more, rather than less, parsimonious as an assumption.‟
27
 For Marc 
Bekoff, animals and humans share traits including emotion and „[b]eing anthropomorphic 
is a linguistic tool to make the thoughts and feelings of other animals accessible to 
humans.‟
28
 Kari Weil adopts a similar argument, and she suggests that studies have 
„worked to prove that many animal species possess the basic capabilities deemed 





To return to Austin-Smith and her analysis of Balthazar, she argues that, on the surface, 
the animal‟s performance is not an example of acting - „the donkey and the character are 
minimally distinguished‟,
30
 furthermore, the creature does not feign, simulate or 
impersonate. However, the animal‟s freedom to „make meaningful choices‟ awards it the 
status of simple actor on Kirby‟s matrix. For her, although the spectator cannot know what 
the donkey in Bresson‟s film thinks or feels, it is bestowed with inwardness. It is „what 
Stanley Cavell calls “privacy,” defined as “personal freedom,” the “right to idiosyncrasy” 
and the “wish for perfect personal expressiveness”.‟
31
 Cavell is discussing Bette Davies‟s 
performance in Rapper‟s 1942 film, Now Voyager; drawing on Breur and Freud in their 
Studies on Hysteria,
32
 he suggests that the human mind is unconscious of itself yet 
produces an affect of the body, „seeing the body as a field of incessant significance, but of 
significance demanding deciphering.‟
33
 Translated into the study of animal performance, 
this suggests that the animal mind also unwittingly produces a theatricality of body which 
requires interpreting „as‟ performance.
34
 If, as Austin-Smith argues, the consequences of 
actors‟ choices are „visible performance signs‟,
35
 then these indicate key traits which also 
aid in the construction of the characters. The selections that the actor makes, however, 
create individuals who have a choice only in a fictional capacity. According to Austin-
Smith, „[m]ovies give us fictional beings we figure out by watching them respond to a 
world arranged by someone else.‟
36
  Nevertheless, even if it is accepted that animals 
cannot feign or impersonate, then the choices that they make create individuality not 
necessarily in a world arranged by someone else, and this is presented outwardly, even 
though, as Austin-Smith argues, this individualism is often necessarily constrained by the 
film language.  
 
For Austin-Smith, despite the film‟s construction, the donkey in Au Hasard Balthazar 
brings into play his own idiosyncrasies which also inform his character‟s role: in the film 
he is „an abused animal [and] functions as a site for predictable viewer affect of, 
respectively, sympathy, judgement and pity.‟
37
 Additionally, to deploy Austin-Smith‟s 
arguments, he also produces observable actions, and, what theatre and performance 
scholar, David Williams, terms a „thinking with body‟
38
 through the options he chooses,
39
 
which also combine to create a performance. Indeed, as Bekoff acknowledges, unlike 
humans, animals cannot filter their emotions. As he purports, „[w]hat they feel is clearly 
written on their faces, made public by tails, ears, and odors, and displayed by their 
actions.‟
40
 Balthazar‟s purposive behaviour ultimately might only serve to fashion his 
filmic character, which is a being only in an illusory sense, and indeed his character‟s 
freedom is hampered by the narrative‟s diegesis. Yes, as Austin-Smith notes,   
 
we believe in the freedom  of the character to have done otherwise and to have 
decided on this rather than that course of action, even if the character‟s decision is 
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finally the refusal of his or her freedom to choose … the donkey‟s performance 
makes possible worthwhile reflections on the role of self-consciousness in acting. 
It also makes worthwhile reflections on the part that expressiveness plays in 
reassuring us of the onscreen presence of a depicted character who is capable of 





Austin-Smith also relates to Dyer‟s work who notes the necessity of understanding screen 
performances through attendance of facial expressions, voice, gestures and body 
movements. While Dyer is referring to human performance signs, these can, as Austin-
Smith notes, relate to animal performance. As she purports, „although the deliberations 
that actors make are indeed invisible to us, the results of those decisions are not.‟
42
 This is 
an argument that Lorraine Daston and Greg Mitman also adhere to: they believe in 
„thinking with animals‟, and argue that this process is partly a means of fulfilling human 
desires and partly as a response to their own inner self that casts them as performers. As 
they purport,  
 
[t]hey [animals] are privileged, and they are performative. They do not just stand 
for something … they do something … They are symbols with a life of their own. 
We use them to perform our thoughts, feelings, and fantasies because, alone of all 
our myriad symbols, they can perform; they can do what is to be done. We may 
orchestrate their performance, but complete mastery is illusion.
43
   
 
  
While Austin-Smith‟s donkey in Bresson‟s film, and the horse in Tarr‟s The Turin Horse 
cannot be said to simulate or impersonate, their performance mobilises idiosyncrasy and 




The Turin Horse follows the life of peasant farmer Ohlsdorfer and his adult daughter, who 
together live a meagre existence in their isolated farmstead in rural Hungary. Their 
poverty entraps them, a point made by the film‟s cinematographer, who has worked with 
Tarr for many years on other projects and notes the director‟s predisposition towards a 
„yearning for the beauty, for the clarity, symmetry and compositional equilibrium of the 
images [which] is possibly the counterpart and expression of a wound torn open by a 
decrepit and disintegrated world.‟
45
 The horse plays a central part in the narrative and is 
the focus of the film because she is crucial to the family‟s survival. The story takes place 
over six days and Tarr divides the film up accordingly. Following the family‟s daily 
struggle for existence, the narrative disequilibrium occurs when the horse falls ill. As 
noted at the outset, on day one Ohlsdorfer drives his mare home in appalling weather 
conditions, the animal struggling against the wind and snow to haul a wood laden cart 
back to the homestead. By day two, and following the horse‟s struggle in the storm, she 
appears to have been taken ill, and after being harnessed and prepared for work, she 
refuses to move. Realising that the animal is sick, Ohlsdorfer‟s daughter is forced to return 
her to the stable. On day three of the story the mare stops eating, and on day four 
Ohlsdorfer and his daughter discover that the well has run dry. The horse continues to 
refuse sustenance, further declining in health and, by day five, father and daughter are 
unable to light the lamps to cook food as they have no fuel. Day six witnesses a desperate 
situation: the two sit huddled around the table forced to eat raw potatoes, the mare still 




At this point it is worth mentioning the horse‟s history. She was purchased by Tarr in a 
small Hungarian village market. As the director himself states, „I said immediately, “This 
is the horse we need”.‟
46
 According to Tarr, the horse was being beaten and he intervened 
and purchased her with the film in mind. As he suggests, „[t]his is a horse who has history, 
who has background, who is definitely somebody … She has a name [original italics]. 
“She” – because we have a female horse … You could see this horse was humiliated. 
She‟s not that old, just around seven. She was a very sad horse … The owner wanted to 
make her work and she refused.‟
47
 While Tarr attributes human emotions to Ricsi, 
undeniably she has her own personal history, and this therefore suggests that she is 
sensitised to ill treatment, particularly when in harness. 
 
In keeping with Ricsi‟s background, and presumably the reason for this choice of animal, 
Tarr arranges her world to depict misery and dejection. Her stable is no more than a mere 
wooden shed full of gaps, thus permitting strong winds and driving rain through its 
apertures. As seen at the outset of the film, she pulls heavy weights in adverse conditions 
and her master raises his voice and whip if she doesn‟t respond. Her life is not only 
arduous, but her only meagre pleasures seem to revolve around the end of the day, as 
indicated on day one when she is unharnessed, bedded down and fed. In a similar vein to 
Austin-Smith‟s initial reflections on Bresson‟s donkey, a superficial analysis suggests that 
Ricsi‟s presentation is not an example of acting in the same way as that of Derzsi and Bók 
in the film. Her character is never fully developed and, although within the context of the 
narrative she appears ill, clearly she is not deliberately impersonating a sick horse - it is 
only the film language that produces such an illusion, and we see an animal not an actor. 
As Austin-Smith might suggest, none of this is premeditated by the horse, who acts like a 
horse and whose performance choices are made for her by the filmmaker.
48
 In terms of 
audience perception of the situation one must assume that she is unwilling or unable to 
move because she is unwell, and as Ohlsdorfer, seen in the background behind the shafts 
of the cart, becomes angry, the mare visibly reacts, appearing to become more frantic and 
stressed.
49
 Eventually, Ohlsdorfer‟s daughter intervenes in the situation and moves to the 
animal‟s head to dismantle her harness, before the old man leads her back into the stable.  
 
This sequence is pertinent for a number of reasons. Clearly, within the film‟s diegesis the 
animal is supposedly ailing, and the narrative impact of this on father and daughter is 
disastrous. Ricsi‟s behaviour corresponds with the narrative situation that Tarr creates, and 
the spectator, through the film language, understands from the animal‟s demeanour and 
refusal to move that she is unable to work. This is reinforced through Ohlsdorfer and his 
daughter‟s deportment, facial expressions and deeds undertaken as a result of her supposed 
illness, along with the framing and editing devices that Tarr deploys: all factors which 
further mobilise spectator understanding of the family‟s terrible predicament. In a similar 
vein to Bresson‟s donkey, while Ricsi is not masquerading, and her character is barely 
differentiated from the horse that she is, she exists in, what Kirby terms, „a symbolised 
matrix‟ in which „the referential elements are applied to but not acted by the performer.‟
50
 
Indeed, the mare cannot intentionally appear sick – yet her actions are also appropriate for 
the narrative trajectory. Furthermore, neither does she perform for the camera; instead her 
movements are purposefully framed by Tarr and his cinematographer. Thus, Ricsi‟s body 
movement and expression also fit the situation/film narrative.  
 
Additionally, and knowing something about the mare‟s background, one must assume that 
Ohlsdorfer‟s behaviour clearly disturbs Ricsi. Indeed, further images of the horse do 
provide traces of, what Cavell terms, expressive freedom and animal idiosyncrasy. For 
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example, on day two, when the horse supposedly falls ill, Ohlsdorfer and his daughter 
fetch the mare from the stable and harness her to the cart; at this juncture, the camera 
focuses on her face in close-up from a front view angle. She champs at her bit and shifts 
uneasily from side to side, clearly affected by the relentless winds that continue to rage. 
Ears laid back, which is a sign of unease in horses, Ricsi seems apprehensive, yet 
accepting of her situation. At this point, however, Ohlsdorfer mounts the cart, raises his 
whip and shouts at the animal to move forwards. She refuses and weaves uneasily from 
side to side, neighing and shaking her head as she completes the manoeuvres. The camera 
withdraws slightly to encompass the horse in near full view, and the spectator witnesses 
her agitation and unease. Thus, the mare engages in a process of selection and presents this 
through outward body signs and expressions which, Cavell might argue, displays her 




Accordingly, as noted, the above information concerning Ricsi‟s purchase is relevant in 
terms of her previous ill treatment and dejection and, although her uneasiness and anxiety 
inform her character as sick animal in the plot, this outward display is also offered as part 
of her gamut of behaviour and is an expression of her own individuality. Here, Ricsi is 
afforded withdrawal into her private world, while the actions and expressions she exhibits 
are framed to eliminate any evidence of such retreat. Just as „Balthazar‟s twitching ears 
and wide eyes as he looks at the circus animals likewise credit him with curiosity and 
wonder, making him more than a walking symbol of suffering‟,
52
 so the mare‟s agitated 
behaviour credit her with fear and bewilderment making her more than a symbol of 
deprivation and sickness - we see her entitlement to be an animal, and to know herself 
even if she remains unknown to us.
53
 As Bekoff concurs, „it‟s possible to mistakenly 
classify an animal‟s behaviour, but it‟s wrong to imply we can never figure it out. Careful 
and detailed behavioural studies have shown time and again that we can indeed 





If the horse in The Turin Horse plays a central role in Tarr‟s film, then Benedikt 
Erlingsson‟s Icelandic comedy, Of Horses and Men (Hross I Oss [2013]), also focuses 
entirely on the Icelandic horse for its narrative structure. Kolbeinn (Ingvar E. Sigurdsson), 
one of the central protagonists, is introduced to the spectator in the opening sequence of 
the film. He is a vain man who breeds and shows horses, takes great pride in his animals, 
and treats them with love and affection. When he takes his horse, a grey mare named 
Grána, out for the first time, he displays her paces to the envy and awe of the neighbours 
who perceive and comment upon her beauty and prowess as they watch the pair pass by. 
The object of the man‟s affection is the widow Solveig (Charlotte Bøving), and Kolbeinn 
is keen to impress. However, Grána subsequently mates with Solveig‟s stallion while 
Kolbeinn is himself riding the mare; this shames him to the point that he perceives no 
other option than to shoot her dead. The remainder of the narrative is structured around a 
series of episodes of horse encounters whereby each mini narrative, although not discreet, 
is mobilised through the animals. 
 
Of Horses and Men in line with Tarr‟s film, does not remove what is animal and creaturely 
about the horses.
55
 At the onset of the film, as noted above, Kolbeinn prepares his horse 
for her first outing and to display her gaits. The tactility of the relationship between man 
and horse is not lost on the spectator when, at the beginning of the sequence, an extreme 
close-up reveals Grána‟s thick fur and the camera pans upwards to the mare‟s ear and then 
a close-up of her eye, Kobeinn mirrored within. Approaching her with the intention of 
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catching her and riding her for the first time, he explains his purpose to her, and she gazes 
towards him before veering to the left then right to evade capture. Eventually he manages 
to place a bridle over her head, but the mare rears upwards before cantering away from 
him. It is unclear whether Grána has already been broken in for riding or not, although her 
behaviour suggests the negative, and also that she is uneasy about the process. Despite the 
horse‟s lack of verbal language, she cannot be denied subjectivity here. As Weil argues, 
„[e]ach and every animal constructs “its” own subjective universe … in which objects are 
perceived and responded to according to the functional or perceptual signs or tones they 
emit for each individual subject.‟
56
 Eventually Kolbeinn manages to bridle her, but she is 
anxious and shakes her head away from her owner. Subsequently he places a saddle on her 
back and the next sequence, through a series of edits, shows a number of onlookers 
awaiting his arrival.  
 
Kolbeinn is a proud man and this aspect of his personality is demonstrated through his 
careful preparation as, seen in medium shot, he dons his coat and looks in the mirror 
before setting off to parade the paces of his new mare. Eventually Kolbeinn stops for 
coffee with Solveig‟s family and passes the reins to Solveig‟s son who tethers the mare 
within view of Brunn, Solveig‟s stallion. Erlingsson focuses entirely on the horse as 
Grána, seen in medium shot, stands quietly, her ears moving backwards and forwards 
listening. The director now introduces Brunn who is agitated at the mare‟s presence, and 
images of Grána are intercut with a medium shot of the stallion cantering up and down a 
perimeter fence. Stopping suddenly, he stands, head held high, ears pricked and gazes 
across at Grána, whereby Erlingsson intercuts with an image of the mare. The sound of 
Brunn‟s whinnying alerts her, and she turns her head towards him and begins to attempt to 
break away from her tether. Here, the stallion‟s behaviour is recognisable and compliant 





Kolbeinn finishes his coffee and, watched by Solveig, unties Grána and rides away from 
the house. A subsequent edit reveals Brunn as he breaks out of his enclosure galloping 
parallel to Grána and Kolbeinn. As the rider proceeds on his way, the camera cuts to a 
long shot of Solveig‟s family as they raise their hands in horror and run towards the 
stallion, already anticipating the ensuing course of events. Kolbeinn‟s mare, aware of 
Brunn‟s attentions, stops in her tracks to Kolbeinn‟s cries of „what‟s wrong?‟ and „move it 
mare!‟. At this point, Grána reveals the whites of her eyes, a sign of unease in horses, and 
lays her ears back. Whinnying, Brunn canters up to the rear end of the mare, Kolbeinn still 
seated astride, and sniffs her rump. Grána braces herself, the camera framing her face as 
she arches her neck in anticipation of the mating. An extraordinary situation follows: 
„what the hell is going on?‟ shouts Kolbeinn, as the camera frames the stallion moving his 
head around the mare‟s rear quarters, before he mounts her and proceeds to mate. This is 
shown from a distance through the perspective of a neighbour and his wife to invoke 
humour, the scene shot through the optic of a pair of binoculars. An ensuing medium 
close-up shot reveals Kolbeinn‟s anguished expression as the animals copulate; the stallion 
now spent, remains slumped over the mare‟s back before dismounting and standing quietly 
raising his upper lip in pleasure. Grána starts and shies slightly, her head raised, mouth 
open straining against her bit, the whites of her eyes still showing. Kolbeinn hurriedly and 
with much embarrassment rides away from the scene leaving Brunn sniffing the ground 
where the mating took place. While Erlingsson intends the scene to be comical, and for the 
pompous Kolbeinn to be ridiculed, Brunn and Grána are behaving as their socio-biological 
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patterning indicates they should, and their outward display is worthy of consideration as 
simple acting.  
 
Brunn and Grána‟s behaviour cannot be repressed by the shaping of the film, and they 
elect their own responses. This is a point reinforced by the director who describes the 
mating scene thus: 
 
It turned out easy but we worried about it a lot. The essence is that the mare had to 
be ready and there are one or two days in her cycle when she gives off the 
hormones that makes the stallion crazy. And when she is ready, nothing will stop 
her and nothing can stop the stallion, if you have the right stallion that‟s not very 
tame and is a little bit without respect for humans. So it was all about the timing. 




This startlingly explicit sequence offers a number of insights into animal performance. In 
one sense the horses are received actors whereby they accrue meaning from context. 
Kolbeinn is proud and trying to impress and further, he has great affection for the animal 
who narratively has betrayed him. Also, the man has been derided in front of his 
neighbours and friends. Conversely, Grána and Brunn do not remain impassive, their 
actions produce visible and easily detectable performance signs. Additionally, they do not 
impersonate or operate as anything other than the creatures that they are, their 
performance choices are visible and external to the preoccupations of the filmmaker; their 
conduct exercises freedom and choice which can be construed as simple acting.  
 
This essay considers the phenomenon of animal acting in cinema. As noted, generally 
animals central to the filmic narrative are anthropomorphised and their role determined by 
the film language. As noted, it is difficult to apply any analysis of animals from a human 
perspective without some anthropomorphic implications, yet neither The Turin Horse or 
Of Horses and Men operate in this vein, and the equine performances are not insignificant 
or negligible. Indeed, just as human gestures and expressions acquire dramatic 
significance in films over and above narrative considerations, so the animal actions can 
also be deemed important and count as simple acting. As Daston and Mitman suggest, „the 
subjective experience of being [animal] could only be inferred through a glass darkly, by 
observing its outward behaviour‟,
59
 and close scrutiny of this mobilises further meanings 
and pleasures for the spectator. Whereas all of the animals studied above are fictionally 
framed, and none can be said to impersonate, animal performance is mobilised through 
bodily actions which occur through independence of thought and inner subjectivity. 
Interiority for Ricsi, Grána and Brunn is, in part, based on their specific life experiences, 
breeding and being animal, yet is visible, and to an extent discernible through external 
signs. As Peterson proposes, 
 
[i]f live animal performance can never fully dehumanize the nonhuman animal, 
then semiotics can never account for it either. In short, semiotics can address much 
of what is “human” in performance – the intended, the “nonanimal human”. But 




This essay argues that those horses studied here are invested with distinctive traits which 
can be examined as part of their performance over and above the confines of the film 
narrative. It has considered animal performance, and within that remit the possibility of 
animals as simple actors. In doing so, it presents the notion that Ricsi, Grána and Brunn 
10 
 
are not inconsequential and all „count for something‟ and their „knowing unknowness‟ 
enables further modes of analysis.
61
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